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The general context
This report is referring to an internship from the 20th of March 2017 to the 4th of August 2017 at AdaCore
located in Paris, France. AdaCore is a company providing commercial software solutions for Ada, a language
targeting safety-critical applications. More specifically, SPARK Pro [1, 2, 12] is a static analysis tool-suite
using formal methods to deductively verify a subset of Ada (called SPARK), commercialized in partnership
with Altran. The tool can be used to meet DO-178B/C (and the Formal Methods supplement DO-333),
CENELEC 50128, IEC 61508, and DEFSTAN 00-56 standards. Its latest revision is called SPARK 2014.
Deductive verification uses SMT solvers (CVC4, Z3, Alt-Ergo) and interactive theorem provers (Coq
and Isabelle) to check the validity of logical propositions (called verification conditions) generated from the
source code and the specification. Those proofs are enough to give a strong guarantee that the program
meets its specification.
The tool is mainly based on Why3 [6], an auto-active verification platform using an intermediate lan-
guage, WhyML, that uses deductive verification techniques to prove user-specified properties (expressed as
contracts in SPARK code) or other automatically generated properties such as absence of run-time errors
(AoRTE). The main limitation in SPARK 2014 is the absence of Ada pointers (called access types in Ada1),
which may require some complex workarounds and code refactoring to make them accepted by SPARK Pro.
The research problem
The main problem in adding access types to SPARK is to control aliasing (when multiple pointers point to
the same object in memory). This heavily complicates proofs, and generally involves human-written anno-
tations.2 Cyclone and Rust are examples of languages that control aliasing using compile-time restrictions
but none of them allows to prove programs.
SPARK already allows to control aliasing between ”references” (implicit pointers created by the compiler
for parameter passing), but not arbitrary pointers. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed method in
this report is a novel approach for controlling aliasing introduced by arbitrary pointers in a programming
language supported by proof. Previous attempts have relied on a combination of access policy enforced by
proof mechanisms (like the so-called Boogie methodology in Spec#). Our approach does not require user
annotations or proof of verification conditions, which makes it much simpler to adopt.
The aim of the internship is to design and implement an aliasing control mechanism that would allow
using pointers in SPARK. Such a design needs to be (almost) fully automatic, to do not impact existing
proofs of programs without pointers, and should be expressive enough so that existing code (such as the
libraries of drivers and containers developed at AdaCore) could be verified using SPARK. Some mathematical
guarantees have to be given on the new design, and its implementation should be tested against a large
existing code-base in SPARK and Ada.
1A more precise definition is given in Ada Reference Manual, section 3.10 [4].
2This is the case for example with separation logic [16].
Your contribution
The main scientific contributions of this report are the following: the design of rules for access types in
SPARK, inspired by Rust’s borrow-checker and affine typing, enforcing Concurrent Read, Exclusive Write
(CREW ) and an intra-procedural move semantics. We also present an implementation in Ada’s compiler
(called GNAT ) front-end as a static analysis pass. Then we formalize these rules on a subset of SPARK and
give a proof of non-aliasing, as done for a subset of Rust in [14] and [15]. Finally, we study these new rules
on existing code-base and examples, in order to check for their applicability for real software, and compare
them to Rust on some idiomatic constructs.
Arguments supporting its validity
The rules established by the author were validated at several levels. The Language Design Committee of
Ada/SPARK, an international board of experts in Ada, validated the rules as a standard feature for a future
version of SPARK (most likely SPARK Pro 19). Comparison with Rust showed a great improvement on
aliasing control at the expense of not handling automatic reclamation and non-null pointer coercion, being
both checked by other passes in SPARK Pro.
Tests on industrial Ada code containing pointers (Ada drivers library, big strings containers library)
showed that this analysis only requires minor changes to the code in order for it to be accepted in SPARK
Pro.
Summary and future work
First future step would consist in extending SPARK tool-chain to have its flow analysis and proof mechanisms
compatible with the new pointers added. Indeed, during the internship, only the anti-aliasing rules have
been implemented, whereas the remaining part of the SPARK back-end needs modifications to analyze
SPARK code containing pointers. For this purpose, a post-doc has been hired by AdaCore to work on those
issues.
Next steps would consist in finalizing the implementation on corner-cases of SPARK, and presenting
the results at an international scientific conference. A more general adoption of those rules by different
customers as well as the generalization of non-aliasing proofs to the complete SPARK language is expected.
A good evolution could also be to formalize those proofs in an interactive theorem prover (such as Coq or
Isabelle) in order to have stronger guarantees on the system.
This internship gives us a better understanding of borrow-checkers and the kind of guarantees they
should give, not only theoretically (formalization of what is a borrow-checker, proof of soundness), but also
in practice (what a borrow-checker should exactly take care of, how to make it understandable to users, how
to integrate it with other tools for static analysis).
A good next question is the study of the constructs that can be implemented using this borrow-checker.
How to make the most of a borrow-checker in order to improve parallelism, compiler optimizations, automatic
reclamation? Answering these questions could lead to useful applications when transferring the borrow-
checker to full Ada, providing it as an additional feature of the language.
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1 Preliminaries
1.1 Ada
Ada is a general purpose language originally standardized in 1983 for the Department of Defense as
a safety-oriented language targeting safety-critical systems. Its latest revision, Ada 2012 is defined by
ISO/IEC 8652:2012. It features strong typing, objects and packages for modularity, and concurrency han-
dling (Ravenscar profile being the best known [5]). A typical Ada program is made of several packages that
can contain declarations (functions, procedures, packages, variables, and types declarations) or initialization
code, that will be executed when the package is loaded.
A lot of features are unique to Ada amongst programming languages for safety-critical applications, in
particular modes of parameters, that can be of mode in, out or in-out.3 An in parameter can be read but
not modified by the callee whereas an in-out parameter can be read and modified, and out parameters can
only be modified (and are considered uninitialized), their values being sent back to the caller.
The language has many features inherited from older versions, and its safety concerns require it to have
a well-defined semantics detailed in the Ada Reference Manual [4].
1.2 SPARK 2014
SPARK 2014 is a subset of Ada designed and suited for static analysis using formal methods. SPARK 2014
features specification constructs allowing writing pre and post conditions, assertions, invariants, data depen-
dencies. A SPARK program is either made of fully written SPARK code, or is a subset of an Ada program
where some subprograms or packages have been marked with a special annotation called SPARK Mode, which
allows mixing SPARK and non-SPARK code.
The main restrictions with respect to full Ada are the absence of pointers and aliasing (some checks are
already done in SPARK to prevent aliasing between parameters and globals) and concurrency handling (only
extended Ravenscar profile [9] is allowed). We also require that objects must fulfill the Liskov Substitution
Principle (LSP) [10], which prevents a more specialized subclass to have its invariants violated by the
methods of the parent class. More specifically this forces the more specialized subclass to implement sub-
behaviors of the parent class with respect to contracts expressed on the parent methods.
In this report, we study a small subset of SPARK enriched with pointers, called µSPARK, the grammar of
which is given in Appendix B. Each µSPARK program consists of a single file that contains a main procedure.
Each procedure starts with a list of definitions (type, procedure or variable) followed by a body. This body
is a sequence of statements, typically assignments, allocations, procedure calls, conditional statements. We
abstract out the condition of the if statement, considering it as a non-deterministic branching.
1.3 Proofs in presence of aliasing
To illustrate how aliasing can cause problems with proofs, let us consider the following function with two
parameters, that increases each of them. The contract that could be expected of such a function (written
in C annotated with ACSL contracts [13]), ensures that the two parameters have their value increased by
one at the end of the function.
/*@
requires \valid(x) && \valid(y);
ensures (*x == \old(*x)+1 && *y == \old(*y)+1 );
*/
void inc (int* x, int* y) {
*x++; *y++;
}
3We added the dash to in-out for readability purposes.
This contract is false in presence of aliasing. Indeed if x and y point to the same variable, then the final
value of each parameter would get increased by two instead of one. In ACSL, it is possible to use a logic
function to express separation of sets of pointers by adding annotations specifying that two pointers should
be considered as non-aliased. The contract hence becomes as following, which gets easily proved using the
WP or Jessie plug-in of Frama-C toolset
/*@
requires \valid(x) && \valid(y);
requires \separated(x,y);
ensures (*x == \old(*x)+1 && *y == \old(*y)+1 );
*/
1.4 Rust
Rust is a new programming language created by Mozilla Foundation [11] and intended for system program-
ming. It focuses mainly on memory safety, with the help of a powerful mechanism called a borrow-checker,
that prevents non-safe aliasing through pointer analysis with techniques inspired by affine types (in which
resources can be used at most once) [8, 17].
The borrow-checker analyzes the source code looking for two different constructs: moves and borrows.
Moves happen at the right-hand side of assignments as well as when passing parameters to functions
that are not borrowed (see after). Resources that are moved are consumed (exactly as in affine types), which
allows only a single path to read or modify resources at a time.
Borrows are temporary grants of a given resource to another path, that can be either immutable (read-
only, using the symbol &) or mutable (read-write, using the symbol &mut). The borrow checker verifies that
when grants are given, the CREW principle is respected, raising errors at each violation. As an example,
let us consider the following code which borrows mutably twice the same path, triggering an error.
let mut r = String ::from("hello");
let mut s = r; // move r to s
let mut s2 = r; // error: use of moved value: ‘r‘
let r1 = &mut s; // mutable borrow of s
let r2 = &mut s; // error[E0499 ]: cannot borrow ‘s‘ as mutable more than once
Rust’s borrow-checker also checks the lifetimes of pointers to make sure that no dangling pointer is used,
and to provide a compile-time garbage collector.
1.5 Main objective
The goal of this internship is to design a mechanism that controls aliasing in SPARK, based on enforcing
CREW. We use a model in which a syntactical element has (full or partial) ownership of all data that is
accessible from it (e.g. a pointer owns the data pointed by it, ...).
The CREW mechanism must ensure that two aliased paths do not have full ownership of the underlying
data. More specifically, either one path has the full ownership (read-write) and the others have no ownership
at all, or all of them have at most partial ownership (read-only).
2 Access types in µSPARK
Three mechanisms have been created to ensure aliasing control, named respectively move, borrow and
observe. The first one consists in checking assignments, whereas the two others focus on subprogram calls.
We present the aliasing rules for µSPARK, while explaining the main differences when passing to complete
SPARK in section 4.2.
2.1 Definitions
We define paths as abstractions of left values (called names in Ada). More precisely, a path is a name in
which all array indices have been abstracted and all dereferences (or equivalently indirections) are made
explicit.4 In the case of µSPARK, names and paths are the same, given that implicit dereference as well as
arrays are excluded from the language. Note that in Ada, dereferences are written using the .all selector.
By introducing the notion of prefixes and extensions of paths, we can use trees to represent a set of
paths, as shown in Figure 1. This tree is defined as the following. Each node represents a path, with the
root being the base identifier. Those nodes can be of three different types: either an Integer node (such as
My Var.all.z), a Pointer node (such as My Var or My Var.all.y), or a Record node (such as My Var.all).
My_Var
0x1
.all:0x2
.all
0x2
a:0x3, b:0x4, c:0x5
.a
0x3
v:42
.b
0x4
.all:0x6
.c
0x5
v:42
.all
0x6
v:42
Figure 1: Example of a tree rep-
resenting the following paths:
My Var, My Var.all, My Var.all.x,
My Var.all.y, My Var.all.z,
My Var.all.y.all.
We will focus our analysis on types that can cause aliasing prob-
lems during assignment or parameter passing, that we call deep,
that are intuitively pointers and records having at least one deep
type component. Formally, a type is said to be deep if it is a type
having an access part.5 Types that are not deep are called shallow.
2.1.1 Reading and writing a path
Let us consider a path (example My Var.all). Our memory model
gives to this path the ownership of all its extensions (hence all the
subtree that is rooted at My Var.all).
When reading this path (for example at a the right-hand side of
an assignment), every extension of this path is read (i.e. My Var.all,
My Var.all.x, My Var.all.y, My Var.all.y.all, My Var.all.z).
Symmetrically, when writing this path (left-hand side of an as-
signment), only extensions that have the same number of deref-
erences are written (My Var.all, My Var.all.x, My Var.all.y,
My Var.all.z but not My Var.all.y.all). Every pointer accessi-
ble from the path gets smashed (My Var.all.y), hence the memory
areas designated by those pointers are replaced by new areas instead
of being written.
This asymmetry is fundamental when considering the rules for
non-aliasing. Reading follows the pointers underlying a data struc-
ture whereas writing is stopped at those pointers, that get smashed
instead.
2.1.2 Permissions
RW
R W
NO
Figure 2: Hasse diagram for the
permission lattice.
To explicitly control aliasing, we must restrict the readability and writabil-
ity of some paths to ensure that only one path can write a given memory
area at a time. For this, we add explicitly permissions on the previous
trees, that can be of four different values: RW (read-write), W (write-only),
R (read-only), NO (no permission). Those permissions form a lattice, whose
Hasse diagram is given in Figure 2.
Those trees enriched with permissions are called permission trees, and
their formal definition is given is Appendix E. Note that those trees are
of infinite depth when a structure has a component of type access to itself
(linked lists, graphs, ...).
4Ada has implicit pointer dereference.
5See Ada Reference Manual, section 3.2.(6/2).
2.2 Moving
Moving is a mechanism that transfers ownership from one or more paths (called the moved paths, the
right-hand side) to another path (the assigned path, the left-hand side).
In order to find all the paths present in the right-hand side that are considered as moved, we first define
the concept of moved expression, and then gather from those expressions every path on which we check the
adequate permissions and update them accordingly. Finally, we update the permission of the assigned path.
More formally, an expression appearing in the right-hand side of an assignment statement is a moved
expression when:
• It is a deep type top-level expression (i.e. expressions that are not part of other expressions).
• It is the prefix of an Access attribute (equivalent to & “address-of” unary operator in C) of a moved
expression.6
• It is a deep type direct sub-expression of a moved expression.
When a moved expression is a name, then this yields directly a moved path. We process each moved path
sequentially by checking first its Read-Write permission, and then deleting both read and write permission
to any path that gets aliased with the assigned path. Using our tree representation, one could remark that
when a path (ie. node) is aliased, then all the subtree rooted at that node is also aliased. Hence we can
directly consider aliases of trees.
My_Var
W
.all
NO
.x
RW
.y
NO
.z
RW
.all
NO
(a) Example of a tree with its per-
missions updated after the path
My Var.all.y has been moved with
Access attribute. The aliased sub-
tree is framed in green.
My_Var
W
.all
W
.x
RW
.y
W
.z
RW
.all
NO
(b) Example of a tree with its per-
missions updated after the path
My Var.all.y has been moved
without Access attribute. The
aliased subtree is framed in green.
My_Var
W
.all
W
.x
RW
.y
RW
.z
RW
.all
RW
(c) The previous tree (Figure 3b)
after assigning My Var.all.y. A
further propagation will give RW
permission to My Var.all and
My Var.
If the path is yielded from the prefix of an Access attribute, then the whole subtree is aliased. Hence,
the whole subtree sees its permission changed to NO, as well as any ancestor node (prefix) of this path that
have the same number of indirections. All other ancestors only lose their readability and get their permission
updated to W.7
In the other case, any subtree that has more indirections than the moved path is aliased. Hence those
subtrees have their permission changed to NO, while all other nodes of the moved tree only lose their
6This prefix is necessarily a name per Ada rules.
7The exact wording as appearing in the SPARK RM says: “After moving a path under Access attribute, the permission for
the path, any of its extensions, and any strict prefix that contains the same number of .all becomes NO permission. Any strict
prefix that does not contain the same number of .all becomes write-only.”
readability. Similarly, all ancestors have their permission set to W.8
Finally, the assigned path is checked to have either W or RW permission. The assigned path and any of
its extensions get RW permission. We then propagate this update to prefixes by increasing their permission
with the greatest lower bound of the permissions of their descendants. More details on this propagation are
given in Appendix E, which defines the PermRelease operator.
2.3 Borrowing
Borrowing consists in a temporary transfer of ownership of a path from a caller to a callee. They happen
only during subprogram call statements. A parameter is said to be borrowed when it is a name of mode
in-out or out,9 or of mode in and of type access-to-variable.10
The last condition allows sending pointers with mode in, and modifying their referenced value while
preventing any modification to the pointer. Ada provides a modifier constant that forbids any modification
to the referenced value, and can be used in order send pointers with mode in without granting the permission
to write on those values.
Intuitively, borrows can be seen as moving the borrowed path (actual parameter) with an Access at-
tribute to the formal parameter, and then moving back the formal parameter to the actual. However,
given that mode in parameters are not necessarily names, this complicates handling the borrows of such
parameters, the details being explained in section 3.2.
The formal definition of a borrowed expression is similar to move, except that we do not require the
top level expression to be deep for modes in-out or out (which coincides well with enclosing the top-level
expression in a Access attribute). Hence, an expression in a procedure call is said to be borrowed if:
• It is an in actual parameter of a procedure and is of type access-to-variable.
• It is an in-out or out actual parameter to a procedure.
• It is the prefix of an Access attribute of a borrowed expression.
• It is a deep type direct subexpression of a borrowed expression.
After gathering the borrowed paths, we check sequentially that they have RW permission (or at least W
for out parameters), and then set any prefix or extension to NO for the whole duration of the call if it is
of deep type, R if shallow (so that its value can be used in other arguments without being passed to the
callee). At the end of the call, every borrowed path has its permission updated to RW, and as for assigns, we
propagate this update to the prefixes of those paths.
In the callee, any borrowed formal parameter of a procedure with mode in or in-out has RW permission,
as well as any of its extensions. Any borrowed formal parameter of a procedure with mode out has W
permission, as well as any of its extensions. We also require that at the end of the subprogram, every
borrowed parameter should have permission RW, so that they could be moved back to the caller.
2.4 Observing
Observing is the mechanism that creates read-only aliases for parameters of mode in to subprograms.
Formally any deep actual parameter of mode in that is not of type access-to-variable is observed, as well as
any deep subexpression of an observed expression.
8The exact wording as appearing in the SPARK RM says: “After moving a path without an Access attribute, the path and
any of its prefixes becomes write-only. Any shallow extension of the path that has the same number of .all stays read-write.
Any deep extension of the path that has the same number of .all becomes write-only. Any extension of the path that has not
the same number of .all becomes NO permission.”
9Only names can be sent to procedures with mode in-out or out.
10See Ada RM, section 3.10.(8) and 3.10.(10) [4].
After gathering the observed paths, we check sequentially that they have at least R permission and then
set any prefix or extension to R for the whole duration of the call. At the end of the call, every observed
path has its permission reverted to the one it had before the call.
In the callee, any observed formal parameter of a procedure, as well as any of its extensions, have R
permission.
2.5 Control structures
The previously given rules describe the evolution of permissions at the level of one block of statements.
They should be completed with others rules that describe the checks done at different control structures
available in SPARK, namely loops and conditions (gotos and exceptions are not available in SPARK). We
only include conditions in µSPARK and exclude loops.
For conditions, we apply our rules on each block independently, yielding to different environments, and
then merge those by taking, for each path, the greatest lower bound of its permission in the different
environments.
For loops, we require permissions to get only less restrictive at the end of the loop, when compared to
the entry. This rule forbids moving the same variable to a different element of an array at each iteration.
3 Proofs of safety
The section that follows provides a proof of the previously given anti-aliasing rules for the µSPARK language.
For this purpose, we first provide a formalization of the µSPARK language with a grammar and typing rules,
then with an operational semantics, and finally a formalization of the previously given rules on which we
provide a proof of non-aliasing.
3.1 Grammar and syntax
We remind that a µSPARK program consists of a single procedure file containing declarations and body. A
declaration can either be a procedure, a record type definition or an uninitialized variable declaration. The
body consists of a sequence of instructions, that can be assignment statements of existing or freshly allocated
values, procedure calls or if statements from which the condition has been abstracted (non-deterministic
choice).
Only integer and user-defined record types are available, as well as accesses to existing types. Note that
there are no loops, nor expression operators, which make the language non Turing-complete.
The full details of the grammar are given in Appendix B.
3.2 Operational semantics
3.2.1 Memory trees
The operational semantics is based on a memory model that keeps some relational information about the
path leading to the designated memory area. To each path, we associate a memory cell with its value. This
leads to the concept of memory trees that are quite similar to permission trees with the exception that those
trees are finite, given that the access nodes can point to null value. Hence, the memory environment Υ is a
mapping from variable declarations to memory trees.
We decide not to represent the implementation of aggregate structures inside the memory, supposed to
be compiler-dependent. Thus we keep in our memory trees only a mapping of fields to children subtrees, as
if one memory cell is enough for a structure to point to all its children. Indeed, without loss of generality,
we can always chose in µSPARK a word size big enough, so that each memory cell contains arbitrarily many
pointers.
Each memory tree is defined in the following way:
M ::= Integer(Cell, V alue)
| Record(Cell, F ields→M)
| Access(Cell,M)
| Access(Cell,Null)
3.2.2 Fresh(tau)
Formally, memory cells are elements of an arbitrary infinite set. We use the word fresh to designate an
oracle that gives a new element of the infinite set (seen as an allocation of a machine word). This construct
can be easily generalized to allocate a whole tree representing a given type τ , which we call fresh(τ). It
takes a type τ as an input and allocates the required memory areas for the type τ using the fresh oracle,
and initializes them with default value.
• fresh(integer) is equivalent to Integer(fresh).
• fresh(access τ) is equivalent to Access(fresh, Null).
• fresh(R) is equivalent to Record(fresh,∀x : τ ∈ R x 7→ fresh(τ)).
3.2.3 Assign
My_Var
0x1
.all:0x2
.all
0x2
a:0x3, b:0x4, c:0x5
.a
0x3
v:42
.b
0x4
.all:NULL
.c
0x5
v:45
(a) The tree of the left hand
side My Var. The assigned part
(My Var.all) is a structure con-
taining three fields, a of type integer
with value 42, b of type pointer to
NULL, and c of type integer with
value 45.
My_Struct
0x6
a:0x7, b:0x8, c:0x9
.a
0x7
v:21
.b
0x8
.all:0xA
.c
0x9
v:14
.all
0xA
v:42
(b) The right-hand side My Struct.
It is a structure containing three
fields, a of type integer with value
21, b of type pointer to an integer
with value 42, and c of type integer
with value 14.
My_Var
0x1
.all:0x2
.all
0x2
a:0x3, b:0x4, c:0x5
.a
0x3
v:21
.b
0x4
.all:0xA
.c
0x5
v:14
.all
0xA
v:42
(c) The left-hand side after assign-
ment. Note that the values of each
node is updated without changing
their addresses except for the indi-
rected integer node (address 0xA)
that is added to the tree.
Figure 4: Example of the semantic rule (E-assignName) applied to the assignment My Var.all :=
My Struct; Pointers are in green, structures in gold, and values in purple.
The assignment of one subtree to a node is peculiar. Indeed, as in real Ada/SPARK, the left-hand side
does not get its memory address changed, only its value. In our representation of the memory this would
look like a (deep) replacement of every value in Integer nodes, as well as a replacement of the subtree
pointed by every Access node.
This leads to the following definition of the recursive AssignΥ(Node,Node) operator (the two parameters
are of same type):
• Assign(Integer(C, ), Integer( , V )) = Integer(C, V )
• Assign(Access(C, ), Access( , P )) = Access(C,P )
• Assign(Record(C, (Fi)i), Record( , (F ′i )i)) = Record(C, (Assign(Fi, F ′i ))i)
For assignments, we copy the value of the left-hand side to the right-hand side. In terms of semantics,
this is done by copying the value of each field, except for pointers where we copy the whole subtree in the
indirection, as shown in Figure 4.
3.2.4 Procedure calls
Another peculiarity happens at procedure calls, where we have to copy the actual parameter into a fresh tree
representing the formal parameter (GetFromExpr, see below), run the semantics on the procedure definition
(yielding Υ′′), and then, depending on mode, copy back its content to the actual parameter. This semantics
follows the compiled code, which pushes the parameters in the stack before call, jumps to the callee, and
then pops them while moving them to the appropriate registers if those parameters are of mode out or
in-out. This can be summarized by the rule (E-call), whose definition can be found in section 3.2.5.
The formal definition of GetFromExprΥ(e) is:
• GetFromExprΥ(null) = Access(fresh,Null)
• GetFromExprΥ(literal) = Integer(fresh)
• GetFromExprΥ(n’Access) = Access(fresh,Υ(n))
• GetFromExprΥ(n) = Υ(n)
We also use SetFromExprΥ(ei, xi) for updating borrowed parameters with mode in (access-to-variable,
note that mode in actual parameters are not solely names, hence the expression needs to be decomposed):
• SetFromExprΥ(null, xi): no update
• SetFromExprΥ(literal, xi): impossible case
• SetFromExprΥ(n, xi) = Assign(n,Υ(xi))
• SetFromExprΥ(n’Access, xi) = Assign(n,Υ(xi.all)) (valid since formal parameters of mode in can-
not be set to null in callee).
3.2.5 Semantics for statements
Every rule is in the form Υ.c =⇒ Υ′, where c designates any construct of the language. We annotate each
semantics rule with s (statements) or d (declarations) for readability purposes.
Υ. x:= null =⇒s Υ[x.all 7→ Null]
(E-assignNull)
n name
Υ. x:= n =⇒s Υ[Assign(x,Υ(n))]
(E-assignName)
Υ. i1 =⇒s Υ′
Υ. if * then i1 else i2 end if =⇒s Υ′
(E-ifConditionTrue)
x : τ ∈ Γ e literal
Υ. x:= e =⇒s Υ[x.value 7→ e]
(E-assignLiteral)
n name
Υ,Φ. x:= n’Access =⇒s Υ[x.all 7→ Υ(n)]
(E-assignAccess)
Υ. x:= new τ =⇒s Υ[x.all 7→ fresh(τ)]
(E-assignNew)
∀j > 0, Υj . ij =⇒s Υj+1
Υ1. begin i1 ... in end =⇒s Υn+1
(E-block)
Υ. i2 =⇒s Υ′
Υ. if * then i1 else i2 end if =⇒s Υ′
(E-ifConditionFalse)
e1..ea with mode in,
ea+1...eb with mode in-out,
eb+1...en with mode out,
Υ′ = {∀ 0 < i ≤ n, xi 7→ GetFromExprΥ(ei)}
Υ′. procedure P (x1, ... , xn) =⇒d Υ′′
Υ′′′ = Υ[∀ 0 < i ≤ a,SetFromExprΥ′′(ei, xi)
∀ a < i ≤ b, Assign(ei,Υ′′(xi))
∀ b < i ≤ n,Assign(ei,Υ′′(xi))]
Υ. P (e1, ... , en) =⇒s Υ′′′
(E-call)
3.2.6 Semantics for declarations
x : τ ∈ Γ
Υ. x : τ =⇒d Υ[x 7→ fresh(τ)]
(E-uninitDecl)
Υ1 = Υ ∀k,Υk. dk =⇒d Υk+1 Υm+1. i =⇒d Υ′
Υ. procedure P (x1, ..., xn) is d1, ..., dm begin i end =⇒d Υ′
(E-procedureDecl)
3.3 Permission rules
Similarly, the rules defined in section 2.1 are mathematically formalized, with semantic-like rules that show
the evolution of permission trees (defined in section 2.1.2) depending on lexical elements of the language
and the mechanism used (borrowed, observed, moved). As for the semantics, we define some constructs to
“allocate”11 (Pfresh), normalize (PermRelease), merge (Fusion) permission trees.
As an example, the same assignment shown in Figure 4 would give the following sequence using the rule
(P-assignDeepName) (all of them can be found in Appendix E). The whole derivation tree is presented
hereafter, for better readability.
The rule (P-assignDeepName) applied to the assignment My Var.all := My Struct checks first that
My Var.all is indeed a well defined deep variable, and that My Struct is a indeed a name. The permission
corresponding to the node My Struct is checked to be Read-Write (using the notation Φ(My Struct)). Then,
we apply the rule (P-M-ident) on the moved name My Struct that modifies its permission to write-only.
The next part of the (P-assignDeepName) rule changes the permission of every extension of the moved
name by putting its strict deep extensions with more indirections to NO permission (My Struct.b.all),
strict deep extensions with same number of indirections of write-only (My Struct.b), and the strict shallow
extensions to read-write (My Struct.a, My Struct.c).12
Only after those changes, we check for write permission to the assigned name (My Var.all). This order
is very important so as to check the safety of assignments of variables to themselves and prevent creating
cycles in data-structures (such as assigning Tree.left.all := Tree). Finally, we change the permissions
of the assigned path to read-write, as well as every extension, and propagate this update to its prefixes with
the PermRelease operator that normalizes the permission tree.
11Technically, the trees are not allocated, but only constructed by the Pfresh operator.
12The Readability lemma shows that if a node has read permission, then all its children have also read permission. This
gives as a corollary that read-write permissions follow the same rule outside procedure calls. Without this lemma, the changes
of permission in the semantics should be interpreted as taking the least upper bound of the given permission and the actual
permission. This method is the one implemented in Ada, being more generic.
My Var.all : S deep ∈ Γ Φ(My Struct) = RW Φ. My Struct Move−−−−→n Φ[My Struct→ W]
(P-M-ident)
Φ′′ = Φ[My Struct→ W][My Struct.b.all 7→ NO My Struct.b 7→ W
My Struct.a 7→ RW My Struct.c 7→ RW] Φ′′(My Var.all) = W,RW
Φ. My Var.all:= My Struct −→s PermRelease(Φ′′[My Var.all,
My Var.all.a, My Var.all.b, My Var.all.b.all, My Var.all.c 7→ RW])
(P-assignDeepName)
The Figure 5 shows the two permission trees associated with My Var and My Struct before and after
the assignment My Var.all := My Struct. Given that the situation is symmetrical, the modification in
permissions admits as an inverse the reverse assignment My Struct := My Var.all.
My_Var
W
.all
W
.x
RW
.y
W
.z
RW
.all
NO
(a) The tree of the left
hand side My Var before as-
signment. The assigned
part (My Var.all) is shown
in green.
My_Struct
RW
.x
RW
.y
RW
.z
RW
.all
RW
(b) The tree of the right
hand side My Struct before
assignment.
My_Var
RW
.all
RW
.x
RW
.y
RW
.z
RW
.all
RW
(c) The tree of the left hand
side My Var after assign-
ment. The PermRelease
operator changed the per-
mission of My Var to RW.
My_Struct
W
.x
RW
.y
W
.z
RW
.all
NO
(d) The tree of the right
hand side My Struct after
assignment.
Figure 5: Example of the permission rule (P-assignDeepName) applied to the assignment My Var.all :=
My Struct;.
As for the operational semantics, the rule for procedure calls is also special. Depending on each argument
mode, we apply a different rule (either Observe, BorrowIntOut or BorrowOut ; the last differs from the
previous by accepting write-only permission to the borrowed actual parameter). Then for every out or
in-out parameter, they are set to read-write as well as all their extensions, as for assignment. Note that
all the changes in permissions during call last only for the duration of the call.
procedure P (x1 : τ1, ... , xn : τn) with
x1...xa observed,
xa+1...xb borrowed with mode in,
xb+1...xc borrowed with mode in-out,
xc+1...xn borrowed with mode out,
Φ1 = Φ
∀ 0 < i ≤ a,Φi. ei Observe−−−−−→e Φi+1
∀ a < i ≤ b,Φi. ei BorrowInOut−−−−−−−−−→e Φi+1
∀ b < i ≤ c,Φi. ei BorrowInOut−−−−−−−−−→e Φi+1
∀ c < i ≤ n,Φi. ei BorrowOut−−−−−−−→e Φi+1
Φ′ = PermRelease(Φ[∀ b < i ≤ n : ei 7→ Pfresh(τi, RW)])
Φ. P (e1, ... , en) −→s Φ′
(P-call)
3.4 Correctness of permission rules with respect to the operational semantics
The anti-aliasing requirement enforces CREW. This means that if an aliased memory node can be written
(by assigning its associated path, or any prefix with the same number of indirections), then any other aliased
node can be neither written nor read using another path.
The way we built our memory representation adds to each memory cell the path used to access it, thanks
to the tree representation. This allows tracking aliasing very precisely, which is by definition the fact of
accessing the same memory cell using two different paths. This gives a straightforward formalization of the
main theorem.
Theorem 1. (No-aliasing). For every set of nodes S in memory environment Υ such that their memory
cells have the same address, consider their associated paths. If there is one path that can be written using
the permission environment Φ, then all other paths in S can neither be written nor read.
3.4.1 Lemmas
Some lemmas are required, so as to prove that an associated path to a memory node always exists. The
solution for this is to compare memory and permission trees, and find out that memory trees are a subset
of permission trees. This is the coherence lemma, whose formalization is given hereafter.
There are other lemmas, used in the proofs, such as the fact that each permission rule leaves the
environment normalized (Normalization lemma), that if a node has permission read, then all its children
nodes also have read permission (Readability lemma), and that the memory cannot loop on itself (No-cycle
lemma).
Lemma 1. (Normalization). Permission environment is normalized.
Proof. Straightforward. Every rule of the semantics calls the normalization operator PermRelease. The
rules that do not call it are (P-block) (trivial case), and declaration rules (they create only new trees with
one node).
Lemma 2. (Coherence). For every node n in the memory environment, it is possible to find an associated
node n′ in the permission environment, such that n and n′ designate the same path.
Proof. Every permission rule manipulates permission trees that have the same constructs as memory trees,
except for access types that cannot be null. Hence every memory tree can be obtained from a permission
tree by cutting nodes at access nodes when the pointer has null value.
Lemma 3. (Readability). If a node has permission R (resp. RW), then all its children have permission R
(resp. RW) at each step of the semantics.
Proof. By induction on the semantics:
1. (E-assignNull), (E-assignLiteral): Pfresh(τ, RW) guarantees it for the assigned path.
2. (E-assignName), (E-assignAccess), (E-assignNew): same thing for the assigned path. For the
moved path, every prefix gets its permission set to either W or NO by the (P-M-ident), (P-M-field),
(P-M-deref) or (P-SM-ident), (P-SM-field), (P-SM-deref) rules. The extensions are handled
by (P-assignDeepName), (P-assignShallowName), (P-assignAccess), and (P-assignNew).
3. (E-call): we create such nodes by observing their paths. The rules (P-O-nullValue), (P-O-
litteral), (P-O-takeAccess), (P-O-name) guarantee that if any node is set to permission R, then
any extension of it is also set to R. After the callee returned, the proof is identical to assignments.
4. (E-block), (E-ifConditionTrue), (E-ifConditionFalse), (E-uninitDecl), (E-
procedureDecl): trivial
Lemma 4. (No-cycle). A node cannot have the same memory cell as any of its descendants (hence memory
trees are finite).
Proof. By induction on the semantics:
1. (E-assignNull), (E-assignLiteral), (E-assignNew): given that those rules only cut memory
trees, there are no new indirections created.
2. (E-assignName): such a cycle could only be created when applying Assign on a node Access(C1, )
which is a descendant of the node being moved Access( , P ). In such a case, this would contradict
hypothesis of the rule (P-assignDeepName), given that we set descendants of the moved node (ie
strict extensions) to NO, before checking RW for the node to assign.
3. (E-assignAccess): such a cycle could only be created if the assigned Access node is a descendant
of the subtree we are taking address of. In such a case, this would contradict hypothesis of the rule
(P-assignAccess), given that we set descendants of the moved node (ie strict extensions) to NO,
before checking RW for the node to assign.
4. (E-call): borrows and observes do not modify addresses before transferring to callee. After returning,
we assign every parameter. Hence identical as (E-assign) on each in-out or out parameter. For
every in parameter, SetFromExpr is equivalent to either assigning n.all or n.
5. (E-block), (E-procedureDecl): trivial by applying the induction hypothesis successively to each
statement of the block.
6. (E-ifConditionTrue), (E-ifConditionFalse): the Fusion operator does not change memory
places and pointers, only permissions.
7. (E-uninitDecl): every node is assigned to a new memory area (and pointers to null). Hence it is
impossible to point to an existing memory area.
3.4.2 No-aliasing proof
Theorem 1. (No-aliasing). For every set of nodes S in memory environment Υ such that their memory
cells have the same address, consider their associated paths. If there is one path that can be written using
the permission environment Φ, then all other paths in S can neither be written nor read.
The main theorem is proved by induction on the operational semantic. This leads us to consider each
semantic rule one by one and show that the invariant holds. As an example, let us consider the proof for
(E-assignName) and (E-call). The full proof is given in Appendix F.
(E-assignName) Let us take any set S in the environments Υ′,Φ′ after executing one step of the se-
mantics. Nodes can only get aliased between the first Access node descendant of assigned and moved node
(because values are recursively copied, up to the first Access node encountered in which the pointer is copied,
which creates an alias).
We can consider only the case when the moved or assigned path y is the one that can be written. Indeed,
by Readability, y cannot be R in Φ. Hence it can only be NO, which leads to a contradiction. If y cannot be
written nor read, then its permission is NO before executing the semantics. By normalization of Φ, we can
say that the glb of its children is also NO (and recursively). Which contradicts RW permission for x.
Executing one step of the semantics creates an alias in x (the assigned path) for every node of any subtree
rooted under an Access node that is a direct descendant of n. However, the rule (P-assignDeepName)
says that when encountering an Access node, all the further descendants are set to NO, hence their paths
cannot be written. The rules (P-M-ident), (P-M-field), (P-M-deref) guarantee also that any extension
of n cannot be read anymore. This solves the case for elements of S that are descendant of x with different
number of .all.
For elements of S that are descendant of x with same number of .all, no alias is created during
assignment, hence induction hypothesis can be applied directly.
Hence, the assigned path gets RW permission (as well as any extensions), but any aliased subtree of this
node cannot be written nor read in the moved tree, hence only one aliased path be written, and all others
can neither be written nor read.
(E-call) The case for procedure calls is particular: indeed we apply our inductive hypothesis after mod-
ifying environments, hence we have to guarantee that the invariants not only hold at the end of the rule,
but also at the moment we transfer the control flow to the callee (ie for Υ′ in (P-call) and Φ′ in (P-
procedureDecl)).
Let us consider such a set S in Υ′ (at the moment transferring to the callee). Suppose that one element
of S can be written. Then the rule (P-procedureDecl) guarantee that this element is borrowed (it is
a borrow of a subtree T of Υ). Hence the rules (P-B-name), (P-B-name-Out), (P-B-takeAccess),
(P-B-nullValue), guarantee that the borrowed subtree has permission set to NO if deep, and R if shallow.
Note that the borrowed subtree cannot have been observed, given that we borrow after observing, hence
we require RW permission on an argument that has been set to R by observation. Thus, it is impossible
for T to be observed, hence creating another element of S that could be readable. For the same reason,
the hypothesis of the rules (P-B-entryPointInOut) and (P-B-entryPointOut) guarantee that the
argument cannot be borrowed twice. Hence if one path can be written, all others cannot be neither written
nor read.
4 Implementation and results
4.1 Laziness of permission trees
The implementation of the permission rules is done in Ada. They are implemented as a separate module
of the GNAT Pro compiler (more precisely in the front-end) and the analysis procedure is invoked from
SPARK analyzer when called with the special flag -gnatdF.
The implementation is 6200 lines long. It involves dynamically allocated tree data structures that are
used to implement the permission trees. However, given that those trees may be infinite, we decided to
proceed with a lazy implementation of permission trees, with a special dethunking method. Indeed, the
maximum depth at which those permission trees are used is the maximum number of lexemes of a path,
which is always finite, and in practice less than 7. Moreover, the AST does not allow easy iteration on
extensions of paths, hence those trees have to be built on the fly, leaving undefined many parameters.
The definition of permission trees is hence modified to accept arrays, as well as fields to records that may
not be referenced by the original definition, but may be added by object oriented programming (class-wide
or incomplete types). Note that the Thunk node may represent both a leaf and an unevaluated internal
node.
P ::= Thunk(Permission, Is Node Deep,Children Permission)
| Record(Permission, Is Node Deep, F ields→ P, P )
| Access(Permission, Is Node Deep, P )
| Array(Permission, Is Node Deep, P )
This creates some approximations in our implementation, specially when setting the permissions to
every extension in our permission rules, given that it is not possible to iterate over extensions. The exact
implementation dethunks the tree depending on the type of the node, except for class-wide or incomplete
types, that are replaced by an over-approximation. Similarly, when the permission changes for the whole
subtree (such as assigning to a node), then the subtree is deallocated and replaced by a Thunk node.
4.2 Complete SPARK
All types 
By-copy 
types 
Not By-
Copy types 
Others 
(shallow) 
Deep types 
Class-wide 
types 
Types with 
access part 
Access 
types 
Access-to-
constant 
Access-to-
variable 
Others 
Figure 6: The different deep types in
full Ada. Access types can be added
the modifier constant that will pre-
vent any modification to the pointed
value. Any other access type is called
access-to-variable.
The rules presented in this report only address a subset of SPARK.
However, during the internship, the rules as well as the implementa-
tion target the complete SPARK added with access types. Complete
SPARK differs from µSPARK on several points.
As evoked before, SPARK has arrays. We apply our permission
rule to all elements, without taking into account the exact index of
that element. That means when assigning to an element of an array,
there are no effects in terms of permissions, given that it is not
known which element has been assigned. In section 4.4, we present
a method to have an iterator over an array of pointers.
Besides procedures, SPARK has functions, that can return val-
ues and whose calls are expressions (instead of statements for pro-
cedures). Note that functions in SPARK can only have parameters
of mode in and cannot have side effects. To handle them safely,
we add the rule that every formal parameter has read-only permis-
sion (observing). Moreover, the expression returned is considered
to be moved. This constructs allows constructors (destructors being
procedures), but not accessors.13
Types for which passing to procedure as parameter can cause
aliasing problems are not the same as the ones that can cause aliasing
problems when being assigned. Actually deep types only designate
the latter, the former being already defined in Ada as not-by copy
types (see Figure 6). Indeed, parameters to procedure are passed
by-copy when they are shallow and can fit in a standard machine register. Other parameters may be passed
by reference if shallow (compiler dependent) or are passed by reference if deep. Hence, the rules for complete
SPARK replace deep by not by-copy in observes and borrows, while deep is kept for moves.
Many features from OOP have been ignored in this report, such as class-wide types. Some approximations
are done to keep the safety of the analysis. We consider all class-wide types to be deep, by just ignoring
their content, and considering them as always aliasing types.
Loops in Ada can be either finite or infinite. Exit statements allow exiting any enclosing loop. Thus, we
require that the permission of each path at the exit point of a loop (exit statement or end of finite loop),
has to be less restrictive than at entry. This is enforced by an hashtable that associates each loop id to two
permission environments, the one at entry and an accumulator that merges every environment at each exit
point of the loop.
Global variables are considered as implicit parameters to the most enclosing procedure, all the more
since SPARK requires specifying the mode of each used global in a procedure. Thus, they obey to the same
rules as formal parameters and actual parameters. When calling a procedure, the caller has to ensure that
every global variable used in the procedure has adequate permissions with respect to specified mode.
Packages in Ada can have elaboration code that is executed when being loaded from outside. Any
initialized global declaration in Ada is implicitly rewritten as initialization code. This feature is very useful
for interacting with hardware that needs to be initialized before any call to the library. In our analysis, we
treat this code as a procedure that has as out parameter every stateful global variable of the package.
4.3 Test suites
The analysis has first been tested on two test suites. The first, called fixedbugs, contains 17041 tests for
all bugs fixed and features added in GNAT Pro compiler. The second is called acats-4 (Ada Conformity
13However Ada has a mechanism called renaming that allows renaming a path to another, acting like an accessor to one
specific path.
Assessment Test Suite),14 and has 3905 standardized tests that every Ada compiler must pass. Those test
suites must be passed in order to show that the new features implemented in the front-end do not break
the existing compiler architecture. However, given that they do not contain any SPARK code, they do not
allow assessing the efficiency of our rules on existing code base.
The most interesting test suite is spark2014, specific to SPARK. This suite has 2087 tests with valid
SPARK code, and our analysis has only 30 regressions, almost all of them being caused by class-wide global
variables that are manipulated with finer graining than the analysis is able to handle.
Finally, a small test suite written by the author has been used to check that the different constructs act
accordingly to the anti-aliasing rules. These tests are inspired by the examples given in Rust borrow-checker
README file.15
4.4 Some use cases
4.4.1 Swap
The first example is the swap procedure, whose naive implementation gets accepted by our rules. Note that
there is no way of implementing a swap function in Rust. In Ada, we take advantage of in-out mode, that
guarantees that after the procedure call, the in-out actual parameter to be assigned is exactly at the same
address than the one being sent to the callee.
procedure Swap (X, Y:in out T) is
Temp :T :=Y; -- Move Y. X:RW , Y:W, Temp:RW
begin
Y:=X; -- Move X. X:W, Y:RW, Temp:RW
X:=Temp; -- Move Temp. X:RW , Y:RW, Temp:W
end Swap; -- Both borrowed arguments X and Y have RW permission.
4.4.2 Iterator
The second example shows how to have a mutable iterator over an array of pointers using the previously
defined swap procedure. The procedure guarantees RW permission for both its arguments. Note that it is
also possible to use renaming declarations for this case, but only the swap method could iterate pairwise
over an array (bubble sorting, ...).
Iterator :=Null; -- Iterator:RW
for i in a..b loop
Swap(Iterator , My_Array(i)); -- Iterator:RW and My_Array (...):RW = Null
DoStuff(Iterator); -- Iterator:RW and My_Array (...):RW = Null
Swap(Iterator , My_Array(i)); -- Iterator:RW = Null and My_Array (...):RW
end loop; -- My_Array:RW
4.4.3 Dynamic data structures
The last example shows some pieces of a code that manipulates trees with their child-sibling representation
[7]. The code has a procedure Free Node that deallocates recursively a whole tree, and some statements
that allocate a tree shown by Figure 7. Then some procedure is called with two nodes passed as borrowed
parameters with mode in-out, before the whole tree is freed.
14They can be downloaded from http://www.ada-auth.org/acats-files/4.1/ACATS41.ZIP
15https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/blob/master/src/librustc borrowck/borrowck/README.md
Figure 7: The tree in example 4.4.3.
procedure Free_Node (N : in out Node) is
if N.Child /= null
Free_Node (N.Child);
end if;
if N.Sibling /= null
Free_Node (N.Sibling);
end if;
Free (N); -- N set to null by Free;
end Free_Node;
Node := new Node; -- allocate node
Node.Child := new Node; -- allocate child
Node.Child.Child := new Node; -- allocate child
Node.Child.Sibling := new Node; -- allocate sibling
Some_Procedure (Node.Child , Node.Sibling);
Free_Node (Node);
4.5 Comparison with Rust
The following section compares Rust and SPARK on some constructs that seem relevant to the author. We
study what features the anti-aliasing allows and what constructs can be done using these rules. The main
difference comes from the fact that SPARK uses provers to handle a lot of safety features, that are handled
directly by Rust’s borrow-checker.
Features SPARK Rust
No-aliasing X X
Lifetime check Specific checks X
Automatic reclamation Pools X
Initialization checking Flow X
Nullity checking By proof X
Simple semantics X [14]
No user annotation X
Figure 8: Comparison of the features available
from the anti-aliasing analysis of SPARK and
Rust.
First comparison is on the features done by the anal-
ysis of both languages (as shown in Figure 8). Even if
both of them prevent non-benign aliasing in the source
code, comparison shows that our rules do not handle as
much features as Rust’s borrow-checker, but allows more
constructs than Rust (such as swap present in 4.4.1).
Indeed, Rust’s borrow-checker checks lifetimes (so
that a local deep variable cannot be assigned to a global
one), whereas this check is implemented as a separate
analysis of GNAT compiler, with some more restrictive
rules than Rust.
Automatic reclamation is handled by Rust’s borrow-
checker (using a static garbage collector), whereas Ada
has a separate feature, called pools, acting like virtual stacks with a scope. Every variable allocated in
this pool gets freed when the pool is destroyed (and lifetime checks prevent aliasing between two pools of
different scopes).
Initialization checks are similarly done by Rust’s borrow-checker in a safe way, whereas our rules only
catch some uninitialized variable usage, with SPARK flow analysis doing the safe and very fine-grained
analysis.
Nullity-checking is also a built-in feature of Rust (there a no safe null pointers in Rust), whereas we
allow them, considering dereferencing a null pointer should be considered as a runtime error (like division
by 0), and should be checked by SPARK static analysis tool-suite at silver level (AoRTE proof) [3].16
Finally, we should note that our analysis does not require any additional user annotation to the source
16The joint Thales-AdaCore guideline defines fives levels of software assurance for SPARK software. The first is stone, that
consists of valid SPARK code. The second is bronze, SPARK code that passed the initialization check and has a correctly
specified data-flow. The third is silver, that adds the proof of AoRTE. The fourth is gold, in which key integrity proper-
ties are proven, such as pre and post conditions, type predicates, loop invariants. The fifth requires full functional proof
of requirements, with a program fully specified. More details can be found on the following blog post http://www.spark-
2014.org/entries/detail/verifythis-challenge-in-spark
code (whereas Rust needs sometimes explicit lifetimes to be specified), and the rules are unambiguously
defined whereas for Rust no official document specifies the borrow-checker (the README provided is quite
incomplete).
Features SPARK Rust
Move semantics X X
Read only grant Only to callee X
Move to callee X X
Move back to caller X Only 1 path
Primitives (swap) X
Fine graining (R/RW) X
Figure 9: Comparison of the constructs accepted
by the anti-aliasing analysis of SPARK and Rust.
Second comparison is on what could be defined as ex-
pressiveness of the analysis, that means which constructs
can be implemented on this analysis. Although we did not
formalize this concept (and did not prove for Rust that
some constructs could not be implemented), we consider
that a little review of some constructs can be useful.
We previously showed that cycling constructs could
not be implemented in SPARK (No-cycle lemma). Rust
has a similar limitation and requires some work-around to
implement structures like graphs (like manually handling
indexes).17 We also saw that swap primitive is available
in SPARK whereas it requires unsafe code in Rust, and the in-out mode allows assigning the exact same
path as the one borrowed. In Rust, this feature is available for only one path by moving the argument to
the callee, and moving back from the callee the argument as return value of the function.
Similarly, our intra-procedural analysis has the best approximation possible on aliasing (except for object
oriented programming), using the lattice of permissions previously defined that allows tracking the exact
path that gets aliased. Rust has a mechanism of restrictions against assignment, mutable borrow, or read-
only borrow, which would correspond respectively to R/NO, R/W/NO, or W/NO. For instance, in Rust, when
moving a variable, every prefix and extension gets restricted indiscriminately, whereas in SPARK, only paths
that access to the aliased data are restricted on their reading or writing permission accordingly.
Another interesting design choice we made, is to ban borrows or observes inside a block, whereas Rust
allows it. Indeed, we do not see use cases for which we need to create several read-only copies of a same
deep variable in the body of a subprogram, all the more since this feature would require some new lexical
constructs (like keywords or symbols), that cannot be added easily in Ada. Moreover, Ada has a mechanism,
called renaming, that is used to shorten long paths, hence also rendering useless read-write borrows of a
path.
5 Conclusion
In this report, we have presented anti-aliasing rules that allow adding pointers to SPARK, a subset of Ada
used for static analysis with deductive verification. We showed a systematic analysis that allows a wide range
use cases of pointers and dynamic allocation, as showed by the experiments. To the best of our knowledge,
this is a novel approach for controlling aliasing introduced by arbitrary pointers in a programming language
supported by proof. Our approach does not require user annotations or proof of verification conditions,
which makes it much simpler to adopt. Moreover, we provided a mathematical proof of the safety of our
analysis, and compared our method to another language providing such analysis, Rust.
Yet, still some work needs to be done to start using this analysis in commercial applications. Indeed,
some constructs of SPARK (specially object orientation) are still not handled efficiently by the rules, and
the back-end still does not implement proofs with pointers, which hopefully will be solved during year 2018.
Similarly, some Ada libraries have to be changed in order to get them accepted by SPARK (drivers and
containers), even though those fixes can be done without major refactoring. We could hopefully expect that
future contributors to these anti-aliasing rules will tackle those problems.
Another long term goal would be extending the analysis so that it could handle different features (like
Rust), such as automatic reclamation, parallelism, initialization and lifetime checks, which will simplify the
existing mechanisms in the GNAT compiler.
17https://github.com/nrc/r4cppp/blob/master/graphs/README.md
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B Grammar for µSPARK
Basic lexemes
〈digit〉 ::= 0− 9
〈alpha〉 ::= a− z|A− Z
〈ident〉 ::= 〈alpha〉(〈alpha〉|〈digit〉| )∗
〈integer〉 ::= 〈digit〉+
〈name〉 ::= 〈ident〉
| 〈name〉.〈ident〉
| 〈name〉.all
Expressions grammar
〈expr〉 ::= null
| 〈integer〉
| 〈name〉’Access
| 〈name〉
Statements grammar
〈instr〉 ::= 〈name〉:=〈expr〉;
| 〈name〉:= new 〈ident〉;
| 〈ident〉( 〈expr〉+, );
| if * then 〈instr〉 else 〈instr〉 end if;
| begin 〈instr〉+ end;
Declarations grammar
〈file〉 ::= procedure 〈ident〉 is 〈decl〉∗ begin 〈instr〉 end;
〈decl〉 ::= type 〈ident〉 is record 〈field〉+ end record ;
| procedure 〈ident〉 ( 〈param〉+; ) is 〈decl〉∗ begin 〈instr〉 end;
| 〈ident〉 : 〈type〉;
〈field〉 ::= 〈ident〉 : 〈type〉 ;
〈type〉 ::= 〈ident〉
| access 〈ident〉
〈param〉 ::= 〈ident〉 : 〈mode〉 〈type〉
〈mode〉 ::= in | in-out | out
C Additional conditions on µSPARK
Some additional conditions are required in order to have valid µSPARK:
• In a procedure call with parameters in-out or out, the parameter should be a 〈name〉.
• It is not possible to write to a formal parameter or any of its fields if it is of mode in.
• A declaration cannot shadow another one.
• Two fields of a record cannot have the same name.
• We consider that all parameters of mode in to procedures are passed by copy. Hence, aliasing between
in bound parameters can only occur between formal parameters of deep type.
• In record declaration, the record being declared can only be used under access type.
D Typing µSPARK
The types for µSPARK are defined as the following:
τ ::= integer | R | access τ | nulltype
where R is a record type. We also write x : τ ∈ R if the record type R has a field x of type τ . We call ≡ the
smallest reflexive and symmetric relationship so that ∀τ, nulltype ≡ access τ . We use Γ to denote a set of
variable, type, and procedure declarations. We write a ∈ Γ if the environment Γ contains the declared object
a. We also use syntactic sugar Γ + d to add the object declared by the declaration d to the environment Γ.
We define deep types by induction. Any access τ type is deep, and any record type R in which there
is at least one field of deep type is also deep. Any type that is not deep is called shallow.
Well-formed typing environments
We call well-formed any typing environment Γ that is built constructively from a well-typed program,
starting with the empty environment. We assume that in the following typing rules, the environments are
well-formed.
Typing rules for names
We write Γ `n n : τ if “in the environment Γ, the name n is well-typed and has type τ”.
x : τ ∈ Γ
Γ `n x : τ
(T-readIdent)
Γ `n n : R a : τ ∈ R
Γ `n n.a : τ
(T-readField)
Γ `n n : access τ
Γ `n n.all : τ
(T-readDeref)
Typing rules for expressions
We write Γ `e e : τ if “in the environment Γ, the expression e is well-typed and has type τ”.
Γ `e null : nulltype
(T-nullValue)
e integer literal
Γ `e e : integer
(T-literal)
Γ `n n : τ
Γ `e n’Access : access τ
(T-takeAccess)
Γ `n n : τ
Γ `e n : τ
(T-name)
Typing rules for statements
We write Γ `s s if “in the environment Γ, the statement s is well-typed”.
Γ `n x : τ ′ Γ `e e : τ τ ≡ τ ′
Γ `s x:= e
(T-assignExpr)
Γ `n x : τ ′ τ ∈ Γ access τ ≡ τ ′
Γ `s x:= new τ
(T-assignNew)
procedure P (x1 : m1 τ
′
1, ... , xn : mn τ
′
n) ∈ Γ
∀i ∈ {1..k},mi = in
∀i ≤ k, (Γ `e ei : τi) ∧ (τi ≡ τ ′i) ∀i > k, (Γ `n ni : τi) ∧ (τi ≡ τ ′i)
Γ `s P (e1, ... , ek, nk+1 ... , nn)
(T-procedureCall)
∀j, Γ `s ij
Γ `s begin i1 ... in end
(T-block)
∀j, Γ `s ij
Γ `s if * then i1 else i2 end if
(T-ifCondition)
Typing rules for declarations
We write Γ `t τ if “in the environment Γ, the type τ is well formed”.
Γ `t integer
(T-baseType)
Γ `t τ
Γ `t access τ
(T-accessType)
R ∈ Γ
Γ `t R
(T-recordType)
We write Γ `d d if “in the environment Γ, the declaration d is well formed”. Note that usage of global
variables is forbidden inside procedures.
Γ `t τ
Γ `d x : τ
(T-uninitDecl)
∀j,Γ `t τ ′i Γ′ := {τ ∈ Γ, procedure P ′ ∈ Γ}+ P + x1 : τ ′1 + ...+ xn : τ ′n
∀k,Γ′ + d1 + ...+ dk−1 `d dk Γ′ + d1 + ...+ dm `s i
Γ `d procedure P (x1 : τ ′1, ..., xn : τ ′n) is d1, ..., dm begin i end
(T-procedureDecl)
∀i,Γ +R `t τi
Γ `d type R is record x1 : τ1, ..., xn : τn end record;
(T-recordDecl)
E Permission rules for SPARk
Definitions
Permission environments
Permission environment Φ are mappings from variable declarations to permissions trees. As shown by the
permission rules, permission environments evolve through the execution of the program. Note that in case
of a recursive record type, the permission tree is infinite.
P ::= Integer(Permission)
| Record(Permission, F ields→ P )
| Access(Permission, P )
Normalized permission environment
We say that a permission environment is normalized when each node of each tree has a permission that is
more permissive than the most restrictive permission of its children.
PermRelease operator
We define a normalization operator called PermRelease that takes a permission environment as input, and
produces another one with permissions of each node changed using the following definition:
PermRelease (Integer(κ)) = Integer(κ)
PermRelease (Record(κ, fi → Fi)) = Record(κ ∨ (
∧
i PermRelease (Fi).P ermission),
fi → PermRelease (Fi))
PermRelease (Access(κ,D)) = Access(κ ∨ PermRelease (D).P ermission,PermRelease (D))
This produced environment is trivially normalized.
Fusion operator
We define an operator called Fusion that takes two (or more) permission environments as input, and outputs
another one where for each node, the permission is updated by taking the glb of every identical node from
the merged environments.
Pfresh(tau,kappa)
We also define the function Pfresh(τ, κ) that takes a type τ and a permission κ as input and produces an
adequate permission tree.
More specifically,
• Pfresh(integer, κ) is equivalent to Integer(κ).
• Pfresh(access τ, κ) is equivalent to Access(κ,Pfresh(τ, κ)).
• Pfresh(R, κ) is equivalent to Record(κ, λx : τ ∈ R.Pfresh(τ, κ)).
Syntactic sugar
We allow modifying or accessing permission and memory trees at a given paths in the environments. For
instance, x.a.all.y 7→ Pfresh(τ) will modify the node x.a.all.y in the tree of x, by replacing its subtree with
a new (fresh) tree.
Permission rules for names
We annotate each permission rule with n, e, s or d for readability purposes.
Move
Φ. ident
Move−−−→n Φ[n 7→ W]
(P-M-ident)
Φ. n
Move−−−→n Φ′
Φ. n.a
Move−−−→n Φ′[n.a 7→ W]
(P-M-field)
Φ. n
Move−−−→n Φ′
Φ. n.all
Move−−−→n Φ′[n.all 7→ W]
(P-M-deref)
Φ. ident
Access−−−−→n Φ[n 7→ NO]
(P-SM-ident)
Φ. n
Access−−−−→n Φ′
Φ. n.a
Access−−−−→n Φ′[n.a 7→ NO]
(P-SM-field)
Φ. n
Move−−−→n Φ′
Φ. n.all
Access−−−−→n Φ′[n.all 7→ NO]
(P-SM-deref)
Borrow
Γ `n n : τ τ deep
Φ. ident
Borrow−−−−−→n Φ[n 7→ NO]
(P-B-identDeep)
Γ `n n.a : τ τ deep Φ.n Borrow−−−−−→n Φ′
Φ. n.a
Borrow−−−−−→n Φ′[n.a 7→ NO]
(P-B-fieldDeep)
Γ `n n.all : τ τ deep Φ. n Borrow−−−−−→n Φ′
Φ. n.all
Borrow−−−−−→n Φ′[n.all 7→ NO]
(P-B-derefDeep)
Γ `n n : τ τ shallow
Φ. ident
Borrow−−−−−→n Φ[n 7→ R]
(P-B-identShallow)
Γ `n n.a : τ τ shallow Φ. n Borrow−−−−−→n Φ′
Φ. n.a
Borrow−−−−−→n Φ′[n.a 7→ R]
(P-B-fieldShallow)
Γ `n n.all : τ τ shallow Φ. n Borrow−−−−−→n Φ′
Φ. n.all
Borrow−−−−−→n Φ′[n.all 7→ R]
(P-B-derefShallow)
Φ(n) = RW Φ. n
Borrow−−−−−→n Φ′
Φ′′ = Φ′[∀n′ strict deep extension of n, n′ 7→ NO,
∀n′ strict shallow extension of n, n′ 7→ R]
Φ. n
BorrowInOut−−−−−−−−−→e Φ′′
(P-B-entryPointInOut)
Φ(n) = W,RW Φ. n
Borrow−−−−−→n Φ′
Φ′′ = Φ′[∀n′ strict deep extension of n, n′ 7→ NO,
∀n′ strict shallow extension of n, n′ 7→ R]
Φ. n
BorrowOut−−−−−−−→n Φ′′
(P-B-entryPointOut)
Observing
Γ `n n : τ τ deep
Φ. ident
ObserveName−−−−−−−−−→n Φ[n 7→ R]
(P-O-ident)
Γ `n n.a : τ τ deep Φ. n ObserveName−−−−−−−−−→n Φ′
Φ. n.a
ObserveName−−−−−−−−−→n Φ′[n.a 7→ R]
(P-O-field)
Γ `n n.all : τ τ deep Φ. n ObserveName−−−−−−−−−→n Φ′
Φ. n.all
ObserveName−−−−−−−−−→n Φ′[n.all 7→ R]
(P-O-deref)
Φ(n) = R,RW Φ. n
ObserveName−−−−−−−−−→n Φ′
Φ′′ = Φ′[∀n′ strict extension of n, n′ 7→ R]
Φ. n
Observe−−−−−→n Φ′′
(P-O-entryPoint)
Permission rules for expressions
Borrow (in or in-out mode)
Note that it is not possible to borrow an integer literal.
Φ. null
BorrowInOut−−−−−−−−−→e Φ
(P-B-nullValue)
Φ. n
BorrowInOut−−−−−−−−−→n Φ′
Φ. n’Access
BorrowInOut−−−−−−−−−→e Φ′
(P-B-takeAccess)
Φ. n
BorrowInOut−−−−−−−−−→n Φ′
Φ. n
BorrowInOut−−−−−−−−−→e Φ′
(P-B-name)
Borrow (out mode)
Only names can be borrowed with mode out.
Φ. n
BorrowOut−−−−−−−→n Φ′
Φ. n
BorrowOut−−−−−−−→e Φ′
(P-B-name-Out)
Observing
Φ. null
Observe−−−−−→e Φ
(P-O-nullValue)
e integer literal
Φ. e
Observe−−−−−→e Φ
(P-O-literal)
Φ. n
ObserveName−−−−−−−−−→n Φ′
Φ. n’Access
Observe−−−−−→e Φ′′
(P-O-takeAccess)
Φ. n
ObserveName−−−−−−−−−→n Φ′
Φ. n
Observe−−−−−→e Φ′′
(P-O-name)
Permission rules for statements
x : τ ∈ Γ Φ(x) = W,RW
Φ. x:= null −→s PermRelease(Φ[x 7→ Pfresh(τ, RW)])
(P-assignNull)
x : τ ∈ Γ e literal Φ(x) = W,RW
Φ. x:= e −→s PermRelease(Φ[x 7→ Pfresh(τ, RW)])
(P-assignLiteral)
x : τ ∈ Γ n name Φ(n) = RW Φ. n Move−−−→n Φ′
τ deep Φ′′ = Φ′[∀n′ strict extension of n with more .all, n′ 7→ NO
∀n′ strict deep extension of n with same number of .all, n′ 7→ W
∀n′ strict shallow extension of n with same number of .all, n′ 7→ RW]
Φ′′(x) = W,RW
Φ. x:= n −→s PermRelease(Φ′′[x 7→ Pfresh(τ, RW))])
(P-assignDeepName)
x : τ ∈ Γ n name
Φ(n) = R Φ(x) = W,RW τ shallow
Φ. x:= n −→s PermRelease(Φ[x 7→ Pfresh(τ, RW))])
(P-assignShallowName)
x : τ ∈ Γ n name Φ(n) = RW Φ. n Access−−−−→n Φ′
Φ′′ = Φ′[∀n′ strict extension of n, n′ 7→ NO]
Φ′′(x) = W,RW
Φ. x:= n’Access −→s PermRelease(Φ′′[x 7→ Pfresh(τ, RW)])
(P-assignAccess)
Φ(x) = W,RW
Φ. x:= new τ −→s PermRelease(Φ[x 7→ Pfresh(τ, RW)])
(P-assignNew)
procedure P (x1 : τ1, ... , xn : τn) with
x1...xa observed,
xa+1...xb borrowed with mode in,
xb+1...xc borrowed with mode in-out,
xc+1...xn borrowed with mode out,
Φ1 = Φ
∀ 0 < i ≤ a,Φi. ei Observe−−−−−→e Φi+1
∀ a < i ≤ b,Φi. ei BorrowInOut−−−−−−−−−→e Φi+1
∀ b < i ≤ c,Φi. ei BorrowInOut−−−−−−−−−→e Φi+1
∀ c < i ≤ n,Φi. ei BorrowOut−−−−−−−→e Φi+1
Φ′ = PermRelease(Φ[∀ b < i ≤ n : ei 7→ Pfresh(τi, RW)])
Φ. P (e1, ... , en) −→s Φ′
(P-call)
∀j > 0, Φj . ij −→s Φj+1
Φ1. begin i1 ... in end −→s Φn+1
(P-block)
Φ. i1 −→s Φ′ Φ. i2 −→s Φ′′
Φ. if * then i1 else i2 end if −→s PermRelease(Fusion(Φ′,Φ′′))
(P-ifCondition)
Permission rules for declarations
Φ. x : τ; −→d Φ[x 7→ Pfresh(τ, W)]
(P-uninitDecl)
procedure P (x1, ... , xn) with
x1...xa observed,
xa+1...xb borrowed with mode in or in-out,
xb+1...xn borrowed with mode out,
Φ′ = {∀ 0 < i ≤ a, xi 7→ Pfresh(τi, R),
∀ a < i ≤ b, xi 7→ Pfresh(τi, RW),
∀ b < i ≤ n, xi 7→ Pfresh(τi, W)}
Φ1 = Φ
′
∀k,Φk. dk −→d Φk+1
Φm+1. i −→d Φ′′
∀i ∈ {a+ 1..n},Φ′′(xi) = RW
Φ. procedure P (x1, ..., xn) is d1, ..., dm begin i end −→d Φ′′
(P-procedureDecl)
F Theorems and proofs
We want to show that at each point of the program, the following lemmas and theorem hold.
Lemmas
Lemma 1. (Normalization). Permission environment is normalized.
Proof. Straightforward. Every rule of the semantics calls the normalization operator PermRelease. The
rules that do not call it are (P-block) (trivial case), and declaration rules (they create only new trees with
one node).
Lemma 2. (Coherence). For every node n in the memory environment, it is possible to find an associated
node n′ in the permission environment, such that n and n′ designate the same path.
Proof. Every permission rule manipulates permission trees that have the same constructs as memory trees,
except for access types that cannot be null. Hence every memory tree can be obtained from a permission
tree by cutting nodes at access nodes when the pointer has null value.
Lemma 3. (Readability). If a node has permission R (resp. RW), then all its children have permission R
(resp. RW) at each step of the semantics.
Proof. By induction on the semantics:
1. (E-assignNull), (E-assignLiteral): Pfresh(τ, RW) guarantees it for the assigned path.
2. (E-assignName), (E-assignAccess), (E-assignNew): same thing for the assigned path. For the
moved path, every prefix gets its permission set to either W or NO by the (P-M-ident), (P-M-field),
(P-M-deref) or (P-SM-ident), (P-SM-field), (P-SM-deref) rules. The extensions are handled
by (P-assignDeepName), (P-assignShallowName), (P-assignAccess), and (P-assignNew).
3. (E-call): we create such nodes by observing their paths. The rules (P-O-nullValue), (P-O-
litteral), (P-O-takeAccess), (P-O-name) guarantee that if any node is set to permission R, then
any extension of it is also set to R. After the callee returned, the proof is identical to assignments.
4. (E-block), (E-ifConditionTrue), (E-ifConditionFalse), (E-uninitDecl), (E-
procedureDecl): trivial
Lemma 4. (No-cycle). A node cannot have the same memory cell as any of its descendants (hence memory
trees are finite).
Proof. By induction on the semantics:
1. (E-assignNull), (E-assignLiteral), (E-assignNew): given that those rules only cut memory
trees, there are no new indirections created.
2. (E-assignName): such a cycle could only be created when applying Assign on a node Access(C1, )
which is a descendant of the node being moved Access( , P ). In such a case, this would contradict
hypothesis of the rule (P-assignDeepName), given that we set descendants of the moved node (ie
strict extensions) to NO, before checking RW for the node to assign.
3. (E-assignAccess): such a cycle could only be created if the assigned Access node is a descendant
of the subtree we are taking address of. In such a case, this would contradict hypothesis of the rule
(P-assignAccess), given that we set descendants of the moved node (ie strict extensions) to NO,
before checking RW for the node to assign.
4. (E-call): borrows and observes do not modify addresses before transferring to callee. After returning,
we assign every parameter. Hence identical as (E-assign) on each in-out or out parameter. For
every in parameter, SetFromExpr is equivalent to either assigning n.all or n.
5. (E-block), (E-procedureDecl): trivial by applying the induction hypothesis successively to each
statement of the block.
6. (E-ifConditionTrue), (E-ifConditionFalse): the Fusion operator does not change memory
places and pointers, only permissions.
7. (E-uninitDecl): every node is assigned to a new memory area (and pointers to null). Hence it is
impossible to point to an existing memory area.
Non aliasing
Theorem 1. (No-aliasing). For every set of nodes S in memory environment such that their memory cell
is identical, consider their associated paths. Then, if there is one path that can be written, then all other
paths in S can neither be written nor read.
Proof of theorem 1. To show that each theorem holds at each point of the program, we reason by induction
on the semantics:
1.
Υ. x:= null =⇒s Υ[x.all 7→ Null]
(E-assignNull)
Let us take any set S in the environments Φ′,Υ′ after executing one step of the semantics. Given
that we do not modify addresses during assignment, this set S also verifies, by induction hypothesis,
non-aliasing before executing that step, in the environments Φ,Υ. There is in S at most one ancestor
of x (No-cycle on Φ). If there are none, there is nothing to prove. If there is one (that we name y),
let us consider the two cases of non-aliasing in Φ,Υ, before executing that step.
• If y is the path that can be written (there is only one by induction hypothesis), then using the fact
paths not related to x do not get their permissions changed, we show that all others paths cannot
be written or read after executing one step of the semantics.
• By (Readability), y cannot be R in Φ. Hence it can only be NO, which leads to a contradiction.
This means that if y can be read, then it can also be written.
• If y cannot be written nor read, then its permission is NO before executing the semantics. By
normalization of Φ, we can say that the glb of its children is also NO (and recursively). Which
contradicts RW permission for x.
2.
x : τ ∈ Γ e literal
Υ. x:= e =⇒s Υ[x.value 7→ e]
(E-assignLiteral)
Exactly the same as (E-assignNull).
3.
n name
Υ. x:= n =⇒s Υ[Assign(x,Υ(n))]
(E-assignName)
Let us take any set S in the environments Υ′,Φ′ after executing one step of the semantics. Nodes can
only get aliased between the first Access node descendant of assigned and moved node (because values
are recursively copied, up to the first Access node encountered in which the pointer is copied, which
creates an alias). Like (E-assignNull), we can consider only the case when the moved or assigned
path is the one that can be written.
Executing one step of the semantics creates an alias in x (the assigned path) for every node of
any subtree rooted under an Access node that is a direct descendant of n. However, the rule (P-
assignDeepName) says that when encountering an Access node, all the further descendants are set
to NO, hence their paths cannot be written. The rules (P-M-ident), (P-M-field), (P-M-deref)
guarantee also that any extension of n cannot be read anymore. This solves the case for elements of
S that are descendant of x with different number of .all.
For elements of S that are descendant of x with same number of .all, no alias is created during
assignment, hence induction hypothesis can be applied directly.
Hence, the assigned path gets RW permission (as well as any extensions), but any aliased subtree of
this node cannot be written nor read in the moved tree, hence only one aliased path be written, and all
others can neither be written nor read.
4.
n name
Υ,Φ. x:= n’Access =⇒s Υ[x.all 7→ Υ(n)]
(E-assignAccess)
Let us take any set S in the environments Φ′,Υ′ after executing one step of the semantics. Nodes can
only get aliased from the subtree we take address and the one that is assigned using ’Access. Like
(E-assignNull), we can only consider exclusive write aliasing, as well as consider the case when the
moved or assigned path is the one that can be written.
Executing one step of the semantics creates an alias of x.all (the assigned path) with the subtree rooted
at n. However, the rules (P-assignAccess), (P-SM-ident), (P-SM-field), (P-SM-deref) ensure
that all the subtree as well as its parents up to the first Access node encountered are set to NO, hence
any of the aliased path (extensions of n) cannot be written. The rules (P-M-ident), (P-M-field),
(P-M-deref) that get applied when applying (P-SM-deref) also guarantee that those aliased paths
cannot be read.
Hence, the assigned path gets RW permission (as well as any extension), but any aliased subtree of this
node cannot be written or read in the moved tree, hence only one aliased path can be written, and all
others can neither be written nor read.
5.
Υ. x:= new τ =⇒s Υ[x.all 7→ fresh(τ)]
(E-assignNew)
Exactly the same as (E-assignNull), given that we allocate fresh memory area not aliased with
anything existing before.
6.
e1..ea with mode in,
ea+1...eb with mode in-out,
eb+1...en with mode out,
Υ′ = {∀ 0 < i ≤ n, xi 7→ GetFromExprΥ(ei)}
Υ′. procedure P (x1, ... , xn) =⇒d Υ′′
Υ′′′ = Υ[∀ 0 < i ≤ a,SetFromExprΥ′′(ei, xi)
∀ a < i ≤ b, Assign(ei,Υ′′(xi))
∀ b < i ≤ n,Assign(ei,Υ′′(xi))]
Υ. P (e1, ... , en) =⇒s Υ′′′
(E-call)
The case for procedure calls is particular: indeed we apply our inductive hypothesis after modifying
environments, hence we have to guarantee that the invariants not only hold at the end of the rule,
but also at the moment we transfer the control flow to the callee (ie for Υ′ in (P-call) and Φ′ in
(P-procedureDecl)).
Let us consider such a set S in Υ′ (at the moment transferring to the callee). Suppose that one
element of S can be written. Then the rule (P-procedureDecl) guarantee that this element is
borrowed (it is a borrow of a subtree T of Υ). Hence the rules (P-B-name), (P-B-name-Out),
(P-B-takeAccess), (P-B-nullValue), guarantee that the borrowed subtree has permission set to
NO if deep, and R if shallow. Note that the borrowed subtree cannot have been observed, given that
we borrow after observing, hence we require RW permission on an argument that has been set to R by
observation. Thus, it is impossible for T to be observed, hence creating another element of S that
could be readable. For the same reason, the hypothesis of the rules (P-B-entryPointInOut) and
(P-B-entryPointOut) guarantee that the argument cannot be borrowed twice. Hence if one path
can be written, all others cannot be neither written nor read.
7.
∀j > 0, Υj . ij =⇒s Υj+1
Υ1. begin i1 ... in end =⇒s Υn+1
(E-block)
Trivial by applying the induction hypothesis successively to each statement of the block.
8.
Υ. i1 =⇒s Υ′
Υ. if * then i1 else i2 end if =⇒s Υ′
(E-ifConditionTrue)
Let us consider such a set S. At the end of executing the first block, they are non-aliased, at the end
of the second block, they are also non-aliased. Hence applying Fusion that only takes the glb cannot
give more permissions to a path than it has before. Hence aliasing cannot occur.
9.
Υ. i2 =⇒s Υ′
Υ. if * then i1 else i2 end if =⇒s Υ′
(E-ifConditionFalse)
Exactly the same as (E-ifConditionTrue).
10.
x : τ ∈ Γ
Υ. x : τ =⇒d Υ[x 7→ fresh(τ)]
(E-uninitDecl)
It cannot point to existing memory area, hence cannot alias.
11.
Υ1 = Υ ∀k,Υk. dk =⇒d Υk+1 Υm+1. i =⇒d Υ′
Υ. procedure P (x1, ..., xn) is d1, ..., dm begin i end =⇒d Υ′
(E-procedureDecl)
Like (E-block), we use inductive hypothesis to each declaration and then each instruction of the body.
